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This paper examines the determinants for entry and expansion modes of German multinational 
enterprises in Portugal. Using a sample of Greenfield and acquisition transactions from 1996 
until 2013, we investigate the impact of previously proven parent-level and industry-level drivers 
that derive from Transaction Cost/Internationalization Theory, Information Economics and 
Industrial Organization Perspective, and further factors that may have had an influence on the 
decision to invest in Portugal. We find evidence that the parent’s size, its R&D intensity, the 
previous experience by another German firm, the target industry's growth and Portugal's 
membership in the Eurozone increase the probability of a Greenfield investment rather than an 
acquisition. In turn, the likelihood of an acquisition increases when the parent is publicly traded 
and productivity in the target industry grows. Our findings confirm that traditional theories can 
be applied to the particular combination of home and host country. Furthermore, specific policy 
recommendations can be given based on the results in order to promote German foreign direct 
investments in Portugal. 
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Internationalizing firms can enter a foreign country either via contractual modes, such as direct 
exports or licensing, or via equity modes, such as Greenfield investments or acquisitions. The 
dominant theories used for explaining the multinational enterprise’s (MNE) choice between 
undertaking a Greenfield investment or acquisition in a foreign country are Transaction 
Cost/Internationalization Theory (Buckley and Casson, 1976; Hennart, 1982; Rugman, 1981), 
Information Economics (Akerlof, 1970; Stigler, 1961), and Industrial Organization Perspective 
(Oster, 1999). According to these theories, the MNE's choice on how to enter and expand in 
foreign countries is based on different MNE-level and target-industry-level factors, amongst 
others the parent's technological knowledge, international experience and host country 
experience, and the target industry's market concentration and availability of takeover targets. 
The identification of drivers for entry and expansion of multinational enterprises (MNEs) into a 
foreign country has been a central subject of interest for international management research in 
the last decades. Traditionally, the decision of the MNE to enter a foreign market was described 
as a unilateral decision of the MNE based on the trade-off between control and tolerance of risk, 
where the latter is a function of the MNE’s familiarity with the host country (Johanson and 
Vahlne, 1977; Anderson and Gatignon, 1986). A different perspective was first introduced by 
Dunning (1980, 1988), who claimed that the MNE would seek an optimal combination of firm-
specific advantages (FSA) and country-specific advantages (CSA) in order to follow a global 
strategy. 
Numerous research studies have been conducted in order to examine the drivers for entry and 
expansion of an MNE into a particular host country or region. However, most studies focused on 
large economies or economic areas, such as Western Europe, China, the United States, Asia, 
Canada, Japan and Great Britain as host regions, with investments originating in other major 
economies, such as the United States, Japan, Western Europe, or Great Britain (Canabal and 
White III, 2008). None of the studies that have been published to date focuses specifically on 
Portugal as a host country. Nevertheless, foreign direct investments (FDIs) are a crucial factor to 
promote growth (Balasubramanyam et al., 1999; Choe, 2003), even more in smaller-scale 
economies. Thus, especially for crisis-ridden Portugal, understanding the determinants for 
foreign entry and expansion is of importance for promoting FDIs in the mid- to long-term.  
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In order to examine whether traditional theories can be applied to the case of Portugal we 
investigate the following research question: 
Research Question 1: Do drivers deriving from traditional literature hold for entry and 
expansion mode choices of German MNEs in Portugal? 
We focus in our research on one home country (Germany) since the results may be more reliable 
and accurate instead of using multiple home countries. Furthermore, we pay our attention only 
on industries whose activities are related to innovation activities. In order to answer to this 
Research Question, eight hypotheses derived from Transaction Cost/Internationalization Theory, 
Information Economics, and Industrial Organization Perspective are built. We thereby focus on 
the ex-ante determinants of entry and expansion modes. 
To complement the existent literature on entry and expansion modes (for an overview see 
Canabal and White III, 2008), we further investigate on the specific drivers for the entry and 
expansion mode choice between a Greenfield investment and an acquisition by trying to answer 
the following question: 
Research Question 2: Which further parent- and host country-factors influence the choice 
between a Greenfield investment and an acquisition of a German MNE in Portugal? 
In addition to the factors used in Research Question 1, we examine further German MNE 
(parent)-specific and Portugal (host country)-specific factors that may have influenced the choice 
between a Greenfield investment and an acquisition in order to propose a model that explains 
this decision as accurately as possible. We introduce factors that may have played a role in the 
particular case of German MNEs investing in Portugal, such as Growth in Productivity, Change 
in Business Confidence and the introduction of the Euro as a currency in 2002. Overall, we create 
three parent-level and three industry-level control variables. 
Based on the answers to both of the Research Questions, we may be able to give 
recommendations on policies in order to attract more FDIs in Portugal.  
The study is structured as follows. In part two, we present the dominant theories on the entry and 
expansion modes' determinants and derive our hypotheses. Section three deals with the applied 
methodology. First, the main variables are identified and described, including the ones built to 
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test the hypotheses and the control variables for the purpose of investigating on Research 
Question 2. Second, the empirical methods and model are described and explained. Third, the 
underlying data and sample are presented. In part four the results of the regression model are 
presented and analyzed. In part five and six, the results on the background of the dominant 
theories and their predictions are summarized, interpreted and discussed together with the 
limitations of our work and future research directions. 
2. Literature Review 
Foreign market entries involve a multinational parent that establishes a subsidiary in a specific 
sector in a host country. Hence, establishment mode choices are realized at the subsidiary-, 
parent-, industry- and country–level. Many studies examine the ex-ante determinants of foreign 
entry modes. There are two distinguishable entry mode types that involve equity participations: 
Greenfield investments and acquisitions. A Greenfield investment occurs when a new subsidiary 
is created from scratch, in an area where no previous facilities exist (Barkema and Vermeulen, 
1998). Two types of subsidiaries can be identified: wholly-owned subsidiaries (WOS), which are 
100% possessed by the MNE, and Joint Ventures (JV), that are held in part by a partner with 
equivalent assets (Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998). On the other hand, an acquisition implies the 
purchase of part or of the entire equity of a preexisting firm (Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998; 
Larimo, 2003), indicating that acquisitions can be wholly- or partially-owned as well. 
We will hereafter present three of the most commonly used theories to explain the determinants 
of foreign establishment mode choice. These are Transaction Cost/Internationalization Theory 
(TCI), Information Economics (IE) and the Industrial Organization Perspective (IO). 
2.1 Transaction Cost/Internationalization Theory 
TCI is the leading theory to explain MNE’s establishment mode choices (Canabal and White III, 
2008) and was initially developed by Buckley and Casson (1976), Rugman (1981), and Hennart 
(1982). Similar to Williamson’s (1975, 1985) version of Transaction Cost Theory, TCI focuses 
on the costs of exchanging intermediate inputs through transactions and on these inputs’ market 
internalization. However, while TCI emphasizes how the limited rationality of actors lowers the 
efficiency of certain input markets, which urges MNEs to internalize these markets, Williamson 
affirms that the choice between market exchange and internalization is influenced by uncertainty 
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and asset specification. TCI has been extended to analyze the choice between Greenfield 
investments and acquisitions by explaining that the MNE’s decision between them is determined 
by a comparison of the costs linked to obtaining or exploiting intermediate inputs abroad through 
these two establishment modes (Hennart and Park, 1993). 
One critical input factor an MNE may pursue abroad is firm-embedded technological knowledge 
(Hennart, 1982). If an internationalizing MNE owns this kind of knowledge the transaction costs 
related to a Greenfield investment may be lower than those of undertaking an acquisition since 
Greenfield investments allow the MNE to build up its technologies from the start and pass on its 
critical skills to a wisely-chosen staff able and willing to incorporate them (Hennart and Park, 
1993). In the case of non-existence of technological knowledge inside of the MNE, the 
internationalizing firm may want to obtain these skills by acquiring foreign firms and their skill-
sets since such knowledge is difficult and expensive to develop internally (Wernerfelt, 1984), 
and also to acquire it separately on the market because of its firm-embeddedness nature (Hennart 
et al., 1996).  
Two additional critical types of knowledge that are often silent are knowledge on how to operate 
internationally and knowledge on how to operate in a particular country (Hennart, 1982). To a 
large extent this knowledge can only be acquired through experience (Johanson and Vahlne, 
1977). Hence, inexperienced MNEs are short of this knowledge and find it expensive to purchase 
it on the market distinctively from its owner. For this reason they are more likely to undertake 
acquisitions to access it, whereas MNEs that are internationally or host-country experienced 
prefer to undertake Greenfield investments, since they already possess it (Caves, 1996; Larimo, 
2003). 
2.2 Information Economics 
IE describes how information affects economic decisions by focusing on existing information 
asymmetries (Stigler, 1961; Akerlof, 1970). Especially in acquisitions those asymmetries are 
present since the acquirer often has insufficient information on the culture and value of its 
targets. Hence, acquirers may have problems concerning the ex-ante evaluation of these targets 
and/or concerning the integration in their corporate network after the deal has been concluded 
(Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987). Specifically this information asymmetry can be particularly 
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large for MNEs with little host-country experience since such MNEs are unfamiliar with existing 
local firms and will thus find it very difficult to evaluate and integrate them. These large 
asymmetries might force them to opt for Greenfield investments (Hennart et al., 1996, Hennart 
and Park, 1993). MNEs that have gained local experience are more familiar with host countries 
and its local firms and may find it easier to evaluate local firms, thus being more likely to 
undertake acquisitions (Hennart et al., 1996, Hennart and Park, 1993).  
Furthermore, there is a possibility that information about conditions in a particular industry in the 
host country may partially become a public good that has become public by the first firm that 
entered the industry and consequently shared this information with other firms from the same 
sector in its home country. The first entrant faces greater informational asymmetries than its 
followers, who can learn from its mistakes (Caves and Mehra, 1986). Hence, if the entrant is the 
first one to enter the industry in a specific country the likelihood for an acquisition should 
increase, because an “entry by acquisition economizes on information costs and reduces 
uncertainty” (Caves and Mehra, 1986, p.462). As a complementary implication, the information 
stock should increase when either more firms have entered the target industry, or the more 
experience a firm has gained in the specific industry of the host country. This higher information 
stock should influence the establishment mode decision towards a Greenfield investment in a 
particular sector, since information costs and uncertainty have already been minimized by the 
experiences gained by (an) earlier entrant(s).  
2.3 Industrial Organization Perspective  
IO states that the MNE’s establishment choice is influenced by the foreign industry’s conditions 
(Caves and Mehra, 1986; Meyer and Estrin, 1997; Oster, 1999; Zejan, 1990). According to IO, 
the major difference between an acquisition and a Greenfield investment is that Greenfield 
investments increase local supply. The increase in local supply is particularly high in 
concentrated industries, since Greenfield entrants need to enter those industries at a large scale in 
order to be able to compete with the few large competitors. This will lead to a large decrease in 
prices and profits, and thus in a competitive response from the incumbents. Hence, MNEs prefer 
to enter concentrated industries through acquisitions (Caves and Mehra, 1986). In turn, the 
likelihood of a Greenfield investment in less-concentrated industries should increase. 
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Also, competitors are more likely to respond to Greenfield entries when their industry is not 
growing, since in this case they would lose market share. MNEs thus prefer to enter slow-growth 
industries via acquisitions. In turn, in case the industry is strongly growing, Greenfield 
investments would not make the incumbents lose market share and would make new entrants 
more tolerable, making Greenfield investments more likely (Zejan, 1990). However, Greenfield 
investments take some time to become operational and in case of high growth industries this 
would result in large foregone profits for the MNE, making an acquisition more likely (Caves 
and Mehra, 1986).  
Another IO characteristic of the industry entered is the availability of takeover targets. In the 
case of lack of suitable firms that can potentially be acquired in a specific target industry, the 
MNE will be forced to enter the industry via a Greenfield investment instead of an acquisition 
(Caves and Mehra, 1986; Larimo, 2003; Zejan, 1990).  
2.4 Summarized Predictions and Further Theories 
Table 1 summarizes the predictions of the described theories. 
Table 1: Predictions of Dominant Theories 
 
Source: Own Contribution 
Furthermore, larger firms have more resources in general. However, a concrete prediction cannot 
be made whether larger resources are a driver for Greenfield investments or acquisitions (Kogut 
and Singh, 1988).  
Construct TCI IE IO
Technological knowledge of parent −
International experience of parent −
Host-country experience of parent − +
Parent is first entrant +
Parent is follower −
Concentration level of industry entered +
Growth rate of industry entered − / ⋃
Availability of takeover targets +
IO = Industrial Organisation Perspective
IE = Information Economics
TCI = Transaction Cost/Internalization Theory
+ = increases likelihood of acquisition; − = increases likelihood of greenfield 
investment; ⋃ = curvillinear effect on likelihood of acquisition
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In addition, managers of highly profitable firms may seek to undertake acquisitions in order to 
increase their reputation, power and salary, even though these acquisitions may not increase firm 
value (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1989; Jensen, 1986).  
2.5 Hypotheses 
Overall, eight hypotheses will be tested relating to the choice between Greenfield investments 
and acquisitions. They are derived from the predictions of TCI, IE and IO, whose theories were 
outlined in the literature review. 
Hypotheses deriving from Transaction Cost/Internationalization Theory 
H1: MNEs prefer Greenfield investments over acquisitions when their technological 
knowledge is high. 
H2: Internationally-experienced MNEs prefer Greenfield investments over acquisitions. 
Hypotheses deriving from Information Economics 
H3: Locally-experienced MNEs prefer acquisitions over Greenfield investments. 
H4: If the MNE is the first to enter the industry in the host country, it will prefer to do so 
through an acquisition rather than a Greenfield investment. 
H5: When a German firm has gained experience in the target industry of the host 
country, the MNE prefer to undertake a Greenfield investment over an acquisition. 
Hypotheses deriving from Industrial Organization Perspective 
H6: MNEs prefer acquisitions over Greenfield investments when the market is 
concentrated. 
H7: MNEs prefer Greenfield investments over acquisitions when the target industry is 
growing. 
H8: MNEs prefer acquisitions over Greenfield investments when the target industry has 




In the following section, the methodology will be outlined. We apply a binary logit regression 
model with one dependent and 16 independent variables. 
3.1 Variables 
In order to examine the validity of the hypotheses, the following variables are tested. Since the 
focus of this study is solely the entry and expansion of one home country (Germany) in one 
target country (Portugal), it is not meaningful to investigate country-specific independent 
variables.
1
 Therefore, the only independent variables tested are (parent-)firm-level and target-
industry-level variables. 
Dependent Variable 
Greenfield. A Greenfield investment is defined as a newly established facility by the German 
MNE. A transaction is defined as an acquisition when it involves the complete or partial takeover 
of an existing Portuguese firm in which it previously did not have a stake. Note that these 
definitions entail both first-time entries and follow-up expansions, i.e. they still apply when the 
German MNE previously had a subsidiary in Portugal and subsequently undertook an additional 
investment. Greenfield is the only dependent variable used. It is a binary variable and assumes a 
value of 1 for a Greenfield investment and a value of 0 for an acquisition. 
Variables to Test the Hypotheses 
Independent Variables 
R&D Intensity. In order to test hypothesis 1, R&D Intensity is used as a proxy for a firm’s 
technological knowledge. TCI predicts that R&D-intensive multinationals prefer Greenfield 
investments over acquisitions, since they are able to exploit their own capabilities better by 
themselves (Anderson and Gatignon, 1986). This finding has been confirmed by several 
empirical studies (Andersson and Svensson, 1994; Brouthers and Brouthers, 2000; Chen and 
Zeng, 2004; Cho and Padmanabhan, 1995; Forsgren, 1990; Harzing, 2002; Hennart and Park, 
1993; Hennart and Reddy, 1997; Padmanabhan and Cho, 1999). However, data availability for 
                                                          
1
 e.g. growth in Gross Domestic Product (GDP)  
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R&D expenditures is poor for our sample, since we also consider not-publicly traded firms. 
Thus, we use the firms’ patent-employee ratio as a proxy. It is important to note, however, that 
this variable measures a firm’s output of R&D efforts (patents) rather than its input (R&D 
expenditures). Furthermore, since the underlying data is highly skewed towards low levels of 
R&D Intensity, and we want to avoid possible issues with outliers, we split the continuous 
variable into two binary ones; Low R&D Intensity, with a value of 1 for R&D intensities below 
the 20
th
 percentile and a value of 0 otherwise, and High R&D Intensity, with a value of 1 for 
R&D intensities above the 80
th
 percentile and a value of 0 otherwise (see Appendix A). 
International Experience. We test for the MNE's International Experience in order to test 
hypothesis 2. TCI predicts that internationally-experienced MNEs prefer Greenfield investments 
since they have already gained substantial knowledge on how to operate in international markets 
and are thus experienced in building subsidiaries from scratch (Hennart and Park, 1993). 
Empirical evidence has been mixed, with findings for both acquisitions (Andersson and 
Svensson, 1994; Caves and Mehra, 1986; Forsgren, 1990; Harzing, 2002) and Greenfield 
investments (Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998; Brouthers and Brouthers, 2000; Padmanabhan and 
Cho, 1999; Wilson, 1980). We use the number of years the firm has had operations abroad prior 
to its investment as a proxy for its international experience. 
Local Experience. In order to validate hypothesis 3 we test for the MNE’s Local Experience. TCI 
predicts that MNEs with more host-country experience prefer to undertake Greenfield 
investments, since they already know about local market characteristics. On the other hand, IE 
predicts that local-experienced firms may use their local expertise in order to evaluate local firms 
more appropriately which increases the likelihood of acquisitions (Hennart and Park, 1993). 
Empirical studies have confirmed the latter theory (Andersson and Svensson, 1994; Barkema and 
Vermeulen, 1998). We measure a firm's local experience as the number of years the firm has had 
operations in the country prior to the investment and do not expect any particular sign. A positive 
sign confirms TCI, while a negative one confirms IE and hypothesis 3. 
First Entrant. According to IE, a firm that is the first one to enter a specific industry in a 
particular target country is more likely to acquire a foreign firm in order to decrease 
informational asymmetries (Caves and Mehra, 1986). The only empirical evidence found this 
variable to be not significant (Caves and Mehra, 1986). In order to test the validity hypothesis 4, 
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we test for this variable in binary form, assuming a value of 1 for a first entrant, and a value of 0 
for a follower. 
German Experience. On the other hand, when a German firm has already invested in a specific 
sector in Portugal, the likelihood that other German companies will follow into the same sector 
in Portugal should increase. IE predicts that in such a case a Greenfield investment will be more 
likely, since a follower will have to face less information asymmetries (Caves and Mehra, 1986). 
This prediction is confirmed by empirical findings (Hennart and Park, 1993). German experience 
is measured as the number of years since when there was a German first-mover in the specific 
sector in Portugal. We test this variable in order to prove the validity of hypothesis 5 and expect 
the coefficient’s sign to be positive if the hypothesis holds. 
Market Concentration. We use the independent variable Market Concentration in order to test 
hypothesis 6. According to IO, concentration should be a driver for acquisitions (Caves and 
Mehra, 1986). However, empirical evidence is mixed (acquisition: Caves and Mehra, 1986; 
Greenfield: Chen and Zeng, 2004; Hennart, Larimo and Chen, 1996). We test this variable by 
using the Hirschman-Herfindahl-Index (HHI) as a proxy for the concentration of the industry 
entered. In order for hypothesis 6 to hold, the sign should thus be negative. 
Growth in Output. In order to capture the growth of an industry in the host country, a firm may 
undertake an acquisition since it makes rapid entries possible (Caves and Mehra, 1986, 
Andersson and Svensson, 1994). On the other hand, IO predicts that Greenfield investments are 
more tolerable for competitors when an industry is expanding rather than being stagnant (Zejan, 
1990). Empirical evidence has proven that the latter explanation holds (Brouthers and Brouthers, 
2000; Zejan, 1990; Meyer and Estrin, 1997). We test this variable in order to validate hypothesis 
7 and expect the sign to be positive. 
Takeover Targets. IO predicts that a higher number of takeover targets in a particular sector may 
increase the likelihood of undertaking an acquisition (Caves and Mehra, 1986; Larimo, 2003; 
Zejan, 1990). We measure the number of takeover targets as the natural logarithm of the number 






Firm Size. Generally, larger firms possess more resources (Kogut and Singh, 1988). Empirical 
evidence shows a tendency towards acquisitions (acquisition: Andersson and Svensson, 1994, 
Larimo, 2003; curvilinear effect towards acquisition: Meyer and Estrin, 1997). We control for 
the firm’s size by using the natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets as a proxy variable. 
Profitability. Finkelstein and Hambrick (1989) outline that managers may undertake acquisitions 
in order to raise their influence and salaries, even if the acquisition does not increase firm value. 
Barkema and Vermeulen (1998) brought empirical support to Finkelstein and Hambrick (1989)’s 
theory. We control for this variable, using the firm’s return on equity (ROE) as a proxy.  
Publicly Traded. Publicly traded firms are expected to have more financing alternatives for 
acquisition-takeovers than not publicly traded ones (Pagano and Panetta, 1998). Empirical 
evidence for the influence of this variable on entry and expansion modes is not available. 
Nevertheless, we use the firm’s legal form as a dummy variable, with a value of 1 for the 
German publicly-traded firm (Aktiengesellschaft, or AG), and a value of 0 for all other legal 
forms. 
Industry-level 
Growth in Productivity. Gains in productivity experienced by firms in a particular sector of the 
host country may draw the MNE's attention. The entrant may try to capture the increase in 
productivity via an acquisition since it is the faster mode of entry (Zejan, 1990). Productivity is 
measured as the Gross Value Added (GVA) of the target industry divided by the number of 
employees that are employed in the sector.  
Change in Business Confidence. When local firms increase their confidence about the foreseen 
business environment, MNEs may be attracted by this confidence and attempt to capture possible 




Eurozone. We control for the time until/since the introduction of the Euro as a currency in 2002. 
It is expected that with increasing time since the introduction of the Euro the likelihood of an 
investment by an MNE increases, because both information asymmetries should decrease and 
firms are not exposed to possible preexisting exchange rate risks anymore, which in turn 
decreases the barriers for an investment. However, it is difficult to predict how this variable 
influences the choice between a Greenfield or acquisition transaction. We nevertheless control 
for this variable. 
Interaction Variable 
Market Concentration X International Experience. Hennart (2009) examines the optimal choice 
between Greenfield investments and acquisitions. Depending on the relative efficiency of the 
markets for assets, one or the other will be more favorable. As Hennart (2009) states, if the local 
firm’s assets are strongly rooted within the firm so that the assets cannot be attained distinctly, 
but the firms’ market is efficient, an acquisition will be the optimal choice. Furthermore, he 
claims that internationally-experienced MNEs will prefer acquisitions over Greenfield 
investments when the market is efficient (Hennart, 2009). In turn, internationally-experienced 
MNEs should prefer Greenfield investments when the market is inefficient. In order to evaluate 
the validity of his hypothesis, we use Market Concentration as a proxy for market efficiency
2
 
and test the interaction between Market Concentration and International Experience. The sign 
should be positive if his hypothesis holds. 
3.2 Empirical Methods 
In order to assess the factors that influence the decision between acquisitions and Greenfield 
investments a regression model is built. The model follows a stepwise logit regression procedure 
with binary outcome. Binomial choice models constitute the traditional methodology in the 
foreign entry mode literature (e.g. Caves and Mehra, 1986; Hennart and Park, 1993; Zejan, 
1990). This model has been widely used in several entry and expansion modes’ research studies, 
that use a dichotomous dependent variable (Brouthers and Brouthers, 2000; Ekeledo and 
Sivakumar, 2004; Erramilli et al., 2002; Erramilli and Rao, 1993). Its major advantage is the 
possibility to estimate the effects of increments in each independent variable on how likely the 
                                                          
2
 The higher the concentration in a certain industry, the less efficient is its market, and vice versa. 
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dependent variable (Greenfield) assumes the value 1 (for a Greenfield investment) in contrast to 
the value 0 (for an acquisition). 
Furthermore, logistic regression models have as a key advantage that they have underlying 
assumptions that are different from linear models: neither linearity between the dependent 
variable and independent variable, nor normality regarding the residuals nor homoscedasticity of 
the independent variables needs to be present in order to receive appropriate results. However, 
the model is critical towards over- or under-fitting the data. In order to cope with this issue, a 
backward stepwise approach will be used where the least-significant variable is removed after 
each step until all independent variables are significant at the 10%-level. In addition, the error 
terms of the independent variables need to be independent and non-multicollinear.  
3.3 Data and Sample 
In general, it is rather difficult to retrieve data on intra-European Greenfield and acquisition 
transactions due to the lack of a centralized institutional body that collects this kind of data.
3
 161 
Greenfield and acquisition transactions by German companies in Portugal from 1996 until 2013 
could be captured. Excluding investments that constitute the creation of a sales office, financial 
investors, parents that lack data availability on independent variables, and industries that are not 
innovation-intensive according to Eurostat’s (2014)’s TOT_INN sectors, the resulting sample 
consists of 73 Greenfield and acquisition transactions. Table 2 gives an overview on the sample, 
separated by primary and secondary NACE codes. 
Most of the analyzed transactions occurred in the manufacturing sector, with a total of 44 
transactions – or 60.3% of the whole sample. The second most frequent transactions were 
undertaken in the information and communication sector.  
The data for the independent variables was compiled from a variety of sources. For a detailed 
overview on the origins of the used data, please see Appendix B.  
 
                                                          
3
 This may also be due to the circumstance that firms which are expanding internationally within 
the EU area are not obliged to report investments being made. 
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Table 2: Sample Overview on Investments by German Companies in Portugal from 1996 until 2013 
 
Source: ThomsonOne SDC (2014), Zephyr (2014), fDi Markets (2014) 
Table 3 presents an overview on the chosen variables and depicts their means, standard 
deviations and correlation coefficients. 
As mentioned above, multicollinearity is critical for logistic regression models, because it can 
lead to inappropriate results. One indicator for multicollinear independent variables are 
significant correlation coefficients, shown in Table 3. However, since multicollinearity usually 
involves more than two variables, pairwise correlations are usually a poor indicator for its 
presence (Long, 1997). Thus, we use multicollinearity measures, which can quantify 
multicollinearity by considering the entire model. Table 4 shows the Variance Inflation Factor 
(VIF), Tolerance and Condition Number for each of the independent variables. 
NACE %
C Manufacturing 44 60.3%
17 Manufacture of paper and paper products 1 1.4%
20 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 5 6.8%
21 Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical preparations 3 4.1%
22 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 1 1.4%
23 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 3 4.1%
24 Manufacture of basic metals 2 2.7%
25 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment 1 1.4%
26 Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products 9 12.3%
27 Manufacture of electrical equipment 4 5.5%
28 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 3 4.1%
29 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 11 15.1%
30 Manufacture of other transport equipment 1 1.4%
D Electricity, Gas, Steam and Air Conditioning Supply 7 9.6%
35 Production of electricity 7 9.6%
G Wholesale and Retail Trade; Repair of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles 4 5.5%
46 Agents (without the sale of motor vehicles) 4 5.5%
H Transportation and Storage 6 8.2%
49 Land transportation and transport via pipeline 5 6.8%
53 Postal and courier activities 1 1.4%
J Information and Communication 10 13.7%
58 Publishing 2 2.7%
62 Computer service activities 8 11.0%
M Professional, Scientific and Technical Activities 2 2.7%








Table 3: Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations (N = 73) 
Source: Own Contribution 
Table 4: Variance Inflation Factors, Tolerance and Condition Number for Selected Models 
Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
1. Greenfield 0.59 0.50
2. Firm Size 8.18 2.95 .04
3. Profitability 0.13 0.17 .12-.36*
4. Publicly Traded 0.78 0.42 -.31* .55* -.57*
5. High R&D Intensity 0.21 0.41 .22 .05 -.17 .19
6. Low R&D Intensity 0.21 0.41 .01 -.15 -.01 -.14 -.26
7. International Experience 44.14 39.52 .14 .47* -.15 .21 .08 -.09
8. Local Experience 14.75 28.45 .21 .39* -.08 .12 .06 .06 .87*
9. German Experience 49.34 40.39 .29* .15 .02 .05 .02 -.17 .14 .33*
10. First Entrant 0.08 0.28 -.26 -.04 -.02 .04 -.15 .22 -.17 -.16-.37*
11. Market Concentration 0.07 0.10 .03 .15 -.04 .07 .04 -.19 -.03 .06 .36* .14
12. Growth in Output 0.05 0.06 .08 .16 .07 .00 -.04 -.11 .13 0.2 .19 -.08 .07
13. Growth in Productivity 0.03 0.05 -.14 .09 .04 -.05 .00 -0.1 .13 .11 -.05 .03 .21 .48*
14. Change in Business Confidence 0.31 3.17 .09 .00 .23 .06 -.02 .04 -.02 .12 .33* -.06 .19 .08 -.06
15. Takeover Targets 10.68 1.59 .24 -.22 -.01 -.06 .10 .14 -.13 -.07-0.3* .08-.34* -.20 -.26 .07
16. Eurozone 0.84 0.37 .46* .04 .04 -.15 .13 .23 .01 .17 -.05 .13 -.01 -.06 -.03 .02 .42*
17. International Experience X 
Market Concentration
3.01 5.79 .10 .35* -.06 .10 .01 -.04 .59* .62* .29* .04 .55* .24 .22 .24-.40* .02
* p < 0.05
Variable
VIF Tol. VIF Tol. VIF Tol. VIF Tol. VIF Tol.
1. Firm Size 2.07 0.48 2.07 0.48 2.07 0.48 1.97 0.51 1.98 0.50
2. Profitability 1.79 0.56 1.76 0.57 1.76 0.57 1.76 0.57 1.73 0.58
3. Publicly Traded 2.21 0.45 2.17 0.46 2.17 0.46 2.17 0.46 2.17 0.46
4. High R&D Intensity 1.24 0.81 1.24 0.81 1.23 0.81 1.24 0.81 1.24 0.81
5. Low R&D Intensity 1.50 0.67 1.49 0.67 1.33 0.75 1.37 0.73 1.46 0.68
6. International Experience 7.38 0.14 6.58 0.15 1.38 0.73 6.52 0.15
7. Local Experience 7.11 0.14 6.90 0.14 1.45 0.69 6.83 0.15
8. German Experience 2.26 0.44 2.16 0.46 1.83 0.55 1.95 0.51 2.01 0.50
9. First Entrant 1.45 0.69 1.44 0.70 1.43 0.70 1.43 0.70 1.44 0.70
10. Market Concentration 2.66 0.38 1.63 0.61 1.62 0.62 1.59 0.63 1.52 0.66
11. Growth in Output 1.58 0.63 1.50 0.66 1.46 0.69 1.46 0.69 1.50 0.67
12. Growth in Productivity 1.59 0.63 1.56 0.64 1.56 0.64 1.55 0.65 1.51 0.66
13. Change in Business Confidence 1.59 0.63 1.39 0.72 1.39 0.72 1.39 0.72 1.32 0.76
14. Takeover Targets 2.10 0.48 1.79 0.56 1.77 0.56 1.78 0.56
15. Eurozone 1.65 0.61 1.63 0.61 1.54 0.65 1.56 0.64 1.33 0.75
16. International Experience X 
Market Concentration
4.31 0.23
Mean VIF 2.66 0.50 2.35 0.55 1.61 0.64 1.62 0.63 2.33 0.57
18.30Condition Number 44.37 40.84 38.60 37.14
Independent Variable
Full Model Model A Model B Model C Model D
Source: Own Contribution 
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Using the full model, three independent variables stand out to be collinear: Local Experience, 
International Experience and the interaction variable International Experience X Market 
Concentration. However, both VIF and Tolerance are within the thresholds proposed by Hair et 
al. (1998) of below 10 for the VIF and above 0.1 for the Tolerance. The third measure for 
collinearity, the Condition Number, is, with a value of 43.51, above Hair et al.'s (1998) threshold 
of 30. Instead of correcting the model for multicollinearity by excluding one of the more 
collinear variables or combining them with each other, we proceed with the full model since the 
explanatory power of each of the three variables is of crucial importance to understand the 
drivers of entry and expansion and the applied stepwise procedure should correct for possible 
collinearity issues. 
However, in order to test for the robustness of our results, we run different modifications of our 
model, as depicted by the columns A to D. Here, we receive lower Condition Numbers that are 
partially still above the threshold of 30 (Model A, B and C) and below the threshold (Model D). 
In all models, we exclude the interaction variable International Experience X Market 
Concentration due to its high levels of correlation with the other variables. In Models B and C 
we exclude each of the variables International Experience and Local Experience due to their 
elevated VIFs. In Model D, we exclude Takeover Targets, since it has been filtered out as the 
main influence for the high Condition Numbers in the other models. In case the results are the 
same for all models, we can assume our results as being robust. 
4. Results 
Table 5 shows the estimation results from the stepwise regression. A positive coefficient means 
that the particular variable increases the likelihood of a Greenfield investment, a negative one 
indicates that the variable increases the probability of an acquisition. Overall, ten steps were 
performed, one for the exclusion of each of the most insignificant variable. Only six steps are 
shown here, the full model (1) and the last five steps (6-10). Even though the explanatory power 
decreases with the exclusion of variables, the final model (10) provides an overall good 
explanatory power of 47.73. 
Note, however, that in logit regressions it is not (entirely) feasible to find statistical implications 
just by observing the coefficients and statistical significance (Ai and Norton, 2003). We thus 
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Table 5: Results for Binary Logit Regression: Greenfield (1) vs. Acquisition (0) 
Source: Own Contribution 
MEM(10)
1. Intercept -15.616 ** -12.595 ** -11.480 ** -9.266 ** -9.312 ** -4.020 **
(6.894) (5.444) (4.971) (4.377) (4.296) (1.937)
2. Firm Size
a
0.387 * 0.361 * 0.364 * 0.362 ** 0.395 ** 0.340 ** 0.077





-5.591 *** -5.224 *** -5.100 *** -4.759 *** -4.706 *** -4.427 *** -0.563
(2.039) (1.717) (1.668) (1.522) (1.499) (1.484) (0.108)
5. High R&D Intensity
b
2.680 ** 2.369 ** 2.255 ** 2.329 ** 2.478 ** 2.657 ** 0.415
(1.301) (1.147) (1.113) (1.101) (1.094) (1.109) (0.119)




7. International Experience 0.027 0.035 0.036 0.010
(0.032) (0.024) (0.024) (0.015)
8. Local Experience -0.077 -0.056 -0.052
(0.047) (0.039) (0.038)
9. German Experience 0.052 * 0.040 *** 0.040 *** 0.031 ** 0.031 ** 0.025 ** 0.006





11. Market Concentration -7.951
(13.114)
12. Growth in Output 13.910 18.131 * 17.426 * 15.973 * 15.739 * 16.050 * 3.617
(10.852) (10.001) (9.604) (9.089) (9.220) (8.820) (1.955)
13. Growth in Productivity -14.420 -18.550 * -18.199 * -17.714 * -18.060 * -20.853 ** -4.700
(10.650) (9.609) (9.411) (9.183) (9.515) (9.233) (2.114)




1.014 * 0.722 * 0.616 0.505 0.522
(0.554) (0.433) (0.386) (0.362) (0.359)
16. Eurozone
b
3.611 ** 3.739 ** 3.804 ** 3.326 ** 3.306 ** 4.192 *** 0.738
(1.538) (1.513) (1.501) (1.384) (1.388) (1.379) (0.105)
17. 0.383 0.073
(0.351) (0.106)
Log-Likelihood -21.4105 -22.7750 -23.0349 -24.0116 -24.2658 -25.5704
R
2
0.5669 0.5393 0.5340 0.5143 0.5091 0.4828
𝟀2 56.05 53.32 52.80 50.85 50.34 47.73
p -value < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001
a 
Variable is a natural logarithm.
b 
Variable is dichotomous.
* p < 0.1
** p < 0.05
*** p  < 0.01
Note: N = 73. The table does not show steps 2 to 5. A detailed table can be found in the Appendix. Values in parentheses are 
standard errors. Column MEM(10) shows the Marginal Effects at the Means for Model 10.
7 8 9 10
International Experience X Market 
Concentration
Greenfield = 1 1 6
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compute the Marginal Effects at the Means (MEM) that are shown for the final model of Table 5 
(column MEM(10)). The MEM makes it possible to assess how marginal changes in a variable 
have an impact on the probability of the occurrence of an event, keeping all other variables at 
their means (Hoetker, 2007). For binary independent variables, the MEM measures discrete 
change, whereas for continuous independent variables it measures the instantaneous rate of 
change, meaning how strongly a small increment in the underlying continuous variable 
influences the propensity of a Greenfield investment. Furthermore, it is possible to determine 
conditional changes in the probability of a Greenfield investment by interacting a binary and a 
continuous variable with each other, which we investigate further in the "Conditional Marginal 
Effects and Robustness of the Results" section.  
4.1 Results for Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1 predicts that R&D-intensive MNEs prefer to undertake Greenfield investments. 
The model estimate accepts the hypothesis at the 95% confidence level, indicating that firms 
with higher technological knowledge prefer to build subsidiaries from scratch. The MEM 
indicates that – for an average firm – having high R&D intensity makes a Greenfield investment 
by 41.5% more likely than being non-R&D intensive. We can thus confirm the findings of 
Forsgren (1989), Hennart and Park (1993), Andersson and Svensson (1994), Cho and 
Padmanabhan (1995), Hennart, Larimo, and Chen (1996), Meyer and Estrin (1997), 
Padmanabhan and Cho (1999), Brouthers and Brouthers (2000), Harzing (2002), and Chen and 
Zeng (2004). 
Hypotheses 2 to 4 are rejected. Neither the international experience of an MNE, nor the MNE’s 
host market experience, nor being the first one to enter the target industry, is a significant 
determinant for Greenfield investments or acquisitions. The result for the MNE’s international 
experience goes in line with the not-significant findings of Zejan (1990), Cho and Padmanabhan 
(1995), Meyer and Estrin (1997) and Larimo (2003), who have also proven that international 
experience is not a significant driver for the choice between Greenfield investments and 
acquisitions. The result that host market experience does not have an influence on the 
establishment mode choice confirms the findings by Hennart and Park (1993), Cho and 
Padmanabhan (1995), Padmanabhan and Cho (1999), and Larimo (2003). The result for the 
variable First Entrant confirms the finding by Caves and Mehra (1986). 
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The number of years a German company has been operational in the target sector, German 
Experience, is significant at the 95% confidence level. We can thus confirm hypothesis 5. The 
variable has – as expected – a positive impact on the decision towards a Greenfield investment. 
The MEM suggests that a 1% increase of a German firm's experience in a particular target 
industry increases the chances of an average German MNE to undertake a Greenfield investment 
by 0.42%. For an additional year a German firm has been operational in the target sector, the 
likelihood increases by 0.85%. We can therefore confirm the results found by Hennart and Park 
(1993). Figure 1 shows the effect of an increase in German Experience on the propensity of a 
Greenfield investment. Interestingly, as long as the experience of a German firm in the target 
sector is below 23 years and 7 months, it is more likely for the German MNE to enter via an 
acquisition.  
Figure 1: Adjusted Predictions for the Likelihood of a Greenfield Investment for an Average Firm 
with Variable German Experience in the Target Sector
 
Source: Own Contribution 
Hypothesis 6 states that MNEs prefer to undertake acquisitions when the market for firms is 
efficient. The parameter estimate for Market Concentration is not significant, giving strong 
support for the rejection of the hypothesis. Hennart and Park (1993) also find this driver to be 
insignificant. 
The variable Growth in Output proves to be significant. We can therefore confirm hypothesis 7. 
The variable is significant at the 90% confidence level and shows a positive sign. For an average 






















German Experience (Years since first investment by German firm in target sector) 
20 
 
by 0.55% more likely. We can thus confirm the findings by Zejan (1990), Meyer and Estrin 
(1997) and Brouthers and Brouthers (2000).  
Hypothesis 8 cannot be confirmed using our model. Hence, the availability of takeover targets no 
statistical significance which confirms the findings by Caves and Mehra (1986). 
4.2 Results for Control Variables 
Among the control variables, six additional variables prove to be significant. The variable Firm 
Size, for which no clear sign could be theoretically predicted, has a positive sign and is 
significant at the 95% confidence level. Since the variable is a logarithm, the estimated 
coefficient indicates that a 1% increase in the assets of a firm increases the odds of a Greenfield 
transaction by 34.0%. In case other empirical literature found this variable to be a significant 
determinant for the choice between Greenfield investments and acquisitions, it was found that it 
is a positive driver for acquisitions (Andersson and Svensson, 1994) or that it has a curvilinear 
effect towards Greenfield investments (Larimo, 2003). Therefore, our result is one that has not 
been proven clearly by previous empirical research. Furthermore, for an average firm, the MEM 
suggests that a 1% increase in the natural logarithm of total assets makes a Greenfield investment 
by 0.95% more likely. At a logarithmic value of 6.28 (or Total Asset value of US$53.4 million), 
the model predicts that the average firm is indifferent concerning the choice between a 
Greenfield investment or an acquisition. Values below this threshold make an acquisition more 
likely, values above it make a Greenfield investment more likely. Figure 2 illustrates the 
marginal effect of the increase in an average firm's size on the probability of a Greenfield 
investment. 
The variable Publicly Traded shows significant parameter estimates at the 99% confidence level. 
As expected, the sign of the estimate is negative, indicating that publicly traded firms prefer to 
undertake acquisitions. In addition, the MEM indicates that being an average publicly-traded firm 
decreases the propensity of a Greenfield investment by 56.3%. 
Furthermore, Growth in Productivity is significant at the 95% level and carries – as expected – a 
negative sign. In other words, an MNE is more likely to undertake a Greenfield investment when 
the industry productivity decreases since it may build and run newly started facilities better on its  
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Figure 2: Adjusted Predictions for the Likelihood of a Greenfield Investment for an Average Firm 
with Variable Size
 
Source: Own Contribution 
own. A 1 percentage-point increase in productivity makes a Greenfield investment for an average 
MNE by 0.72% less likely.  
The impact of Growth in Productivity and Growth in Output on the odds of undertaking a 
Greenfield investment is illustrated in Figure 3. As can be seen, the two curves are 
approximately inverted to each other. However, they are not perfectly inverted and differ in 
certain aspects. At a zero-growth rate, the Growth in Output shows an estimated probability of a 
Greenfield investment of 48.18%, indicating that an acquisition would still be more likely, and a 
growth rate of 0.5% at which the average MNE is indifferent towards the choice between a 
Greenfield investment and an acquisition. In turn, for an average firm the Growth in Productivity 
appears to have a likelihood of 78.79% for a Greenfield investment at stagnant growth and a 
growth rate of 6.25% at which it is indifferent towards the choice between a Greenfield 
investment and an acquisition.  
Lastly, the binary variable Eurozone is significant at the 99% confidence level. The sign is 
positive, and it can be inferred that the introduction of the Euro as a currency in 2002 has had a 
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Figure 3: Adjusted Predictions for the Likelihood of a Greenfield Investment for an Average Firm 
with Variable Growth in Output and Growth in Productivity 
Source: Own Contribution 
suggests that the probability of undertaking a Greenfield investment increased by 73.8% due to 
the introduction of the Euro.  
The remaining variables have proven not to be significant drivers for the choice between 
Greenfield investments and acquisitions. 
4.3 Conditional Marginal Effects and Robustness of the Results 
The analysis beforehand assumed average values for the binary variables which has no real 
applications (e.g. a firm cannot be 78% publicly traded; or, at least, the nature of binary variables 
cannot capture this). It is, therefore, meaningful to estimate the before mentioned marginal 
effects for the continuous variables in dependence on each of the significant dichotomous 
variables, which makes it possible to estimate interaction effects and to analyze our results more 
deeply. Table 6 gives an overview on the conditional marginal effects at the means for the 
significant continuous variables, dependent on the occurrence or non-occurrence of the 
dichotomous variables. In other words, the depicted values show the elasticity of small changes 
in the continuous variables based on the means of the other significant variables, conditional to 


























Table 6: Conditional Marginal Effects at the Means for Significant Continuous and Dichotomous 
Variables 
Source: Own Contribution 
The change in probability for a Greenfield investment differs substantially depending on the 
value of the binary variable. The biggest divergence in a small change of a continuous variable is 
estimated for a small increase in Firm Size and the membership of the Eurozone. Also, the 
largest impact is estimated for an average company that undertook an investment while Portugal 
was not yet part of the Eurozone and differs from the other average companies by being 1% 
larger based on the average LN value, or by US$ 305.55 million in absolute terms. The least 
significant change can be estimated for a 1 percentage point increase from the mean for the 
Growth in Output and a not-publicly traded company (0.026%). However, the indicated 
elasticities are rather difficult to understand (they constitute the slope of the marginal probability 
curve, or “a ratio of a ratio”). Figures 4 to 6 should therefore help to understand the impact of the 
dichotomous variables better. The figures are grouped into four sub-figures, each for the changes 
in one underlying continuous variable. Each sub-figure shows three curves, one for the 
occurrence of the binary variable, one for non-occurrence, and one for the average value. 
Figure 4 shows the estimations conditional to the firm being publicly traded and not being 
publicly traded. As can be seen, for an average firm, the predictions for a non-publicly traded 
firm are that it is more likely for all observed firm sizes to undertake a Greenfield investment 
than being publicly traded. Additionally, the curve approximates asymptotically a probability of 
100% with growing firm size. A publicly traded firm on the other hand prefers to undertake an 
acquisition until a logarithmic value of 9.13 (or Total Assets of US$ 922.8 million in absolute 
terms) and should opt for a Greenfield investment with increasing firm size. The effect of being a 
publicly traded firm on the experience of another German firm in the target sector is very similar. 
No Yes No Yes No Yes
Firm Size
a 8.18 8.27 0.95% 0.04% 1.62% 1.32% 0.16% 2.66% 0.57%
German Experience 49.34 49.84 0.42% 0.04% 1.62% 0.59% 0.07% 1.18% 0.26%
Growth in Output 4.50% 4.60% 0.55% 0.03% 0.93% 0.76% 0.09% 1.53% 0.33%
Growth in Productivity 3.18% 3.28% -0.72% -0.03% -1.21% -0.99% -0.13% -1.95% -0.44%
Note: The full table including the predicted probabilities for each case can be found in the Appendix.
a
 Variable is a natural logarithm
1%  increase 
(0.1 pp increase 
for ratios)











Being not-publicly traded, the probability of a Greenfield investment is always above 95% from 
4 years of German experience onwards. For what concerns an average publicly traded firm, until 
a prior experience of another German firm in the target sector of approximately 62 years and 2.5 
months it is more likely to undertake an acquisition. Beyond this threshold, a Greenfield 
investment is more likely.  
For the annual growth of the target industry, the curve of being a non-publicly traded firm is 
shifted by about minus 28% in growth when compared to the curve of a publicly traded one, 
making a non-publicly traded firm reaching the indifference threshold at a negative growth rate 
of the target sector (-21.05%) and thus substantially earlier than a publicly traded firm (6.57%). 
Source: Own Contribution 
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Figure 4: Publicly Traded-Conditional Marginal Effects at the Means for Firm Size, German 
Experience, Growth in Output and Growth in Productivity 
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Also, the propensity of a Greenfield investment at stagnant (0%-growth) is substantially 
different: At this point, a non-publicly traded firm is as likely as 96.72% to undertake a 
Greenfield investment, whereas for the publicly traded one the probability is only 26.05%, 
making an acquisition more likely. The opposite effect can be observed for the annual growth in 
productivity, where the curve of a non-publicly traded firm is shifted by about plus 21% in 
growth over the curve of a publicly traded firm. A publicly traded firm should opt for a 
Greenfield investment until efficiency gains are 1.65% or lower, whereas for a non-publicly 
traded firm this threshold is at an annual productivity increase of 22.85%. 
Figure 5 shows the effects of an average firm being highly R&D intensive versus not being 
highly R&D intensive on the continuous variables. Even though the sub-figures may look similar 
to the ones from Figure 4, the effect of High R&D Intensity is inverted to Publicly Traded, 
meaning that firms that show to be highly R&D intensive have a higher likelihood of 
undertaking a Greenfield investment. The probability of a Greenfield investment is always above 
60% for firms of all size classes and is approximating asymptotically 100%, as long as they are 
highly R&D intensive. Not highly R&D intensive firms are predicted to enter via an acquisition 
until a logarithmic value of the assets of 7.88, or US$ 264.3 million in absolute terms. After a 
firm passes this threshold, a Greenfield investment becomes more likely with growing firm size. 
Independently from the experience previously gained by another German firm in the target 
sector, a highly R&D intensive firm undertakes a Greenfield investment with a probability of 
over 80%. Not highly R&D intensive firms are estimated to prefer acquisitions until a threshold 
of 45 years and 3 months of experience gained by another German firm in the target sector. 
The curve of the growth in output for highly R&D intensive firms is shifted by approximately 
minus 16% when compared to the curve for not-highly R&D intensive firms. Ergo, a Greenfield 
investment is earlier likely to be undertaken by firms that are highly R&D intensive. Until an 
annual decrease of the target industry of 12.70%, an acquisition is more likely for these firms, 
whereas for not-highly R&D intensive firms a threshold of 3.87% can be predicted. The curve 
for highly R&D intensive firms is shifted by approximately plus 10% in the case for the growth 
in productivity when compared to not-highly R&D intensive firms. The threshold until a 
Greenfield investment is more probable is 3.57% for not-highly R&D intensive firms and 
16.42% for highly R&D intensive firms. 
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Figure 6 shows the estimations for the continuous variables conditional to the membership of the 
Eurozone. Portugal being part of the Eurozone increased the chances of Greenfield investments 
substantially. The Total Assets’ value from which a Greenfield investment becomes more likely 
than an acquisition decreased substantially from a logarithmic value of 16.58 to 4.25, or from 
US$ 158.71 billion to US$ 70.11 million. Furthermore, even though the previous experience of 
other German firms in the target sector does have an impact on the likelihood of a Greenfield 
investment, it is above 50%, independently from the previous experience gained by them. 
Source: Own Contribution 
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Figure 5: High R&D Intensity-Conditional Marginal Effects at the Means for Firm Size, German 




Furthermore, for the Growth in Output of the target industry, before the introduction of the Euro 
an acquisition was the more likely establishment mode choice until a growth rate until 22.30%. 
After the Eurozone admittance, this threshold decreased to -3.85%, making a Greenfield 
investment more likely afterwards. For the Growth in Productivity, a Greenfield investment is 
more likely until 9.57% in growth, since the introduction of the Euro. This threshold was at -
10.56% before the Eurozone. 
Table 7 gives a summary of the thresholds at which an average firm is indifferent towards the 
decision between an acquisition and a Greenfield investment.  
Source: Own Contribution 
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Figure 6: Eurozone-Conditional Marginal Effects at the Means for Firm Size, German Experience, 
Growth in Output and Growth in Productivity 
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Table 7: Indifference Points for Conditional Marginal Effects at the Means for Significant 
Continuous and Dichotomous Variables 
 Source: Own Contribution 
Appendix E shows the results for the performed robustness checks. The model modifications A 
to D yield exactly the same result due to the applied stepwise procedure. Hence, our results can 
be seen as robust. 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
The study at hand constitutes the first attempt to investigate the determinants of the mode for 
entry and expansion by German MNEs in Portugal. Primarily, we tried to answer the following 
research question: 
Research Question 1: Do drivers deriving from traditional literature hold for entry and 
expansion mode choices of German MNEs in Portugal? 
Firm Size
a - 9.13 7.88 - 16.58 4.25
German 
Experience
- 62y2.5m 45y3m - 163y3m -
Growth in 
Output
-21.05% 6.57% -12.70% 3.87% 22.30% -3.85%
Growth in 
Productivity
22.85% 1.65% 3.57% 16.42% -10.56% 9.57%
a
 Variable is a natural logarithm
Note:  Shown values indicate the point at which an average firm is indifferent towards the decision between a greenfield investment and an 
acquisition. The shown graphs are miniature versions of Figures 4 to 6. The intersection of the horizontal line and the curve indicates the 












We found evidence that factors deriving from all three considered theories (Transaction 
Cost/Internationalization Theory, Information Economics and Industrial Organization 
Perspective) have an impact on the choice between acquisitions and Greenfield investments of 
German MNEs in Portugal.  
Among the factors that derive from Transaction Cost/Internationalization Theory, we can 
conclude that a crucial element for the choice between a Greenfield investment and an 
acquisition is the factor of technological knowledge, this meaning that highly-skilled German 
MNEs prefer to undertake Greenfield investments. This result indicates that for highly-skilled 
MNEs transaction costs are lower for a Greenfield investment when compared to an acquisition, 
since a Greenfield investment makes it possible for the MNE to build its own facilities from 
scratch and transfer its critical skills to its own selection of employees. Hence, they are able to 
exploit their own capabilities better on their own.  
Interestingly, neither the international experience of the German MNE nor its experience in 
Portugal has an impact on the choice between a Greenfield investment and an acquisition. This 
may be related to the period of our sample (1996 to 2013) which is majorly located in the time 
when Portugal was already part of the Eurozone. Both inexperienced and experienced German 
firms may have seen Portugal's admission to the Eurozone as a pre-selection of countries to 
expand into and concluded that their aggregated experiences gained abroad or in Portugal itself 
have no influence on how to enter the country. 
Concerning the factors that derive from Information Economics, we could only find evidence for 
the previous experience gained by German firms in the target sector. Our results indicate that the 
longer a German firm has had operations in the sector of interest, the more likely another 
German company will follow by investing in a Greenfield project. However, we estimated a 
threshold of 23 years and 7 months until a German firm is more likely to acquire an existing 
Portuguese firm. Hence, only long-term aggregated experiences by other German firms make a 
German MNE opt for a Greenfield investment. The probability of a Greenfield investment is 
increased when dealing with a not publicly traded firm or a R&D intensive firm. Also, the Euro 
as a currency favored this trend. As an explanation, Information Economics suggests that the 
information asymmetry and uncertainty towards the target industry have decreased due to the 
increased information stock which has been accumulated by a previous German entry. This study 
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suggests that this information stock is sufficiently large enough when 23 years and 7 months 
passed from the entry, in order for a German MNE to undertake a Greenfield investment. The 
finding may also be seen as proof that Organizational Learning is determined by the culture in 
which the MNE is rooted (Hickson, 1996; Hofstede, 1983). Using this argumentation lets us 
conclude that the information efficiency among German MNEs is good, which may also be due 
to the rather strict (when compared to other countries) disclosure requirements established by the 
German government (Grundei and Talaulicar, 2002). 
For what concerns the variables derived from the Industrial Organization Perspective, the growth 
rate of the industry entered proved to be the only influential driver. As long as growth is above 
0.5%, the MNE will prefer to undertake a Greenfield investment. Below this growth rate, the 
German MNE will prefer to acquire an existing Portuguese firm. The result indicates that 
Greenfield investments are more tolerable for competitors when the industry is growing. Also, in 
stagnant or shrinking industries, acquisitions are more likely due to possible profitability losses 
or bankruptcies of existing firms that MNEs might be able to acquire at a smaller or even at a 
negative premium. Both for not publicly traded and highly R&D intensive firms this trend is 
shifted towards negative growth rates at which a Greenfield investment is being undertaken, 
indicating in turn that publicly traded and not-highly R&D intensive firms prefer to enter 
growing industries via a Greenfield investment at positive growth rates. 
Remarkable is the finding that local market concentration does not play a role in the decision 
between a Greenfield investment and an acquisition of German MNEs in Portugal, even though 
several research studies have proven this factor to have an impact. 
The second Research Question was: 
Research Question 2: Which further parent- and host country-factors influence the choice 
between a Greenfield investment and an acquisition of a German MNE in Portugal? 
Out of the six additionally examined factors we found two parent-level and two host-country 
factors to have an impact on the decision of the establishment mode. 
Among the parent-level factors, we could confirm that the German MNE's size is a determinant 
for establishment mode choice. The fact that this variable is significant is already interesting. 
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Larger firms have more resources than smaller ones. Even though it could not be predicted 
whether larger resources are used for outright acquisitions or Greenfield investments, our results 
indicate that until a total asset's value of US$ 53.8 million an acquisition is more likely. For sizes 
above this value, a Greenfield investment is more probable. Hence, larger firms opt for 
Greenfield investments which may be because larger firms' cultures are more distinctive, and it 
may be easier to transfer a firm's culture through Greenfield projects since the new employees 
are selected according to the standards of the parent and are not taken over from the acquired 
firm. Even though acquisitions may be the faster mode of entry, larger resources may enable 
larger firms to build Greenfield facilities at a greater speed. The probability of a Greenfield 
investment further increases when the firm is not publicly traded and highly R&D intensive. In 
addition, the introduction of the Euro had an additional positive impact on the likelihood of a 
Greenfield investment, making firms already opt for Greenfield investments from a total assets’ 
value of approximately US$ 7 million upwards.  
A second parent-level factor that proved to be a significant driver for establishment mode choice 
is the corporate form of the entrant. We found that German publicly traded firms 
(Aktiengesellschaft, or AG) are more likely to undertake acquisitions in Portugal. Although the 
share price of a publicly traded firm usually falls upon the announcement of an acquisition, 
managers may seek to increase their power, salaries and prestige in the long-term by undertaking 
acquisitions. Especially the reputation is of importance in the case for publicly traded companies 
since this corporate form involves higher publication duties. 
Among the industry-level factors that affect establishment mode choice, we found three further 
drivers to be significant. Our evidence suggests that an increase in productivity is a determinant 
for acquisitions. By contrary, the growth rate of the entered industry is a driver for Greenfield 
investments. When the target industry's productivity is growing above a rate of 6.25%, an 
acquisition is more likely. Below this threshold, a Greenfield investment is the most probable 
establishment mode. A reason German MNEs are more likely to undertake acquisitions when 
productivity increases at a substantial rate could be that German MNEs try to capture related 
gains in efficiency and are not able to build facilities that are as productive as existing ones in the 
target industry. On the contrary, managers of German MNEs do not consider productivity gains 
below 6.25% strong enough to justify an acquisition in the target country and may assume that 
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they could better leverage productivity by setting up their own facilities. Furthermore, the 
probability of a Greenfield investment is shifted towards higher growth rates when the firm is not 
publicly traded and highly R&D intensive. 
The last influential factor on the choice between Greenfield investments and acquisitions is 
Portugal’s membership in the Eurozone. We could find proof that the introduction of the Euro 
was a significant driver for Greenfield investments by German companies. A reason for this 
could be that the risk exposure due to currency fluctuations of the German D-Mark and the 
Portuguese Escudo was bigger in the case of Greenfield investments due to larger investment 
volumes.  
The results allow us to give specific recommendations to attract more German FDIs in Portugal. 
Note, however, that these recommendations may only be applicable for FDI inflows from 
Germany – the transfer to other origins is critical and not scientifically backed up. Also, the 
adaption to industries different from the ones considered may also be critical. We assume that 
Greenfield investments are the more favorable type of FDIs, since they are associated with 
creating jobs and leveraging local supply (Caves and Mehra, 1986). Thus, the variables that were 
found to be significant drivers for Greenfield investments can be used as a basis for policies that 
deal with attracting Greenfield investments. 
In general, R&D-intensive German MNEs are more likely to undertake Greenfield investments. 
Furthermore, larger, non-public firms tend to prefer Greenfield projects. In order to attract more 
Greenfield projects by German firms, policies should therefore aim at the promotion for these 
types of companies. In addition, German firms that have already invested in Portugal should be 
supported in order to maintain their commitment since their experience is shared with other firms 
from their home country and may attract further FDIs in its sector of operation. Moreover, 
policies should be aimed at boosting output in the industries that may be of interest for German 
MNEs, since growth attracts Greenfield projects. Lastly, since the Eurozone has proven to be a 
success factor for leveraging Greenfield investments, free trade policies should be further 





6. Limitations and Directions for Further Research 
Our sample may have been exposed to idiosyncratic characteristics. The sample size was 
relatively small, with 73 observed predictions. We only considered transactions from one home 
country (Germany) to one target country (Portugal). Applications to other countries may 
therefore be critical. Moreover, Portugal is a rather small market that may display different 
characteristics when compared to larger economies. Furthermore, we focused only on industries 
that are related to innovation activities in order to be able to test our hypotheses. Specifically in 
the case for Portugal, future research may hence consider other countries of origin or compare 
FDIs undertaken in Portugal to FDIs undertaken in similar target countries. Future research could 
also study a broader sample that is not narrowed down on specific sectors. 
In addition, we only examined the drivers for the strategic choice between a Greenfield 
investment and an acquisition. The impact of the factors on other strategic choices, such as the 
one between a Joint Venture and a wholly-owned subsidiary may yield new insights. Also, 
strategic options that do not involve equity participations, such as licensing, franchising, and 
exports may be an object of future studies. 
We only investigated entry and expansion modes and did not focus on the post-performance of 
Greenfield investments or acquisitions by foreign firms in Portugal. This topic could be explored 
as well. 
Finally, even though we examined the impact of the introduction of the Euro, it would be 
interesting to analyze how particular policies have an impact on the choice between a Greenfield 
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Appendix A: Histogram for R&D Intensity and Chosen Cut-Off Barriers for Categories 
 


































Above 80th percentile: 
High R&D Intensity 
Below 20th percentile: 
Low R&D Intensity 
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Appendix B: Overview, Types, Predicted Sign, Measurement and Sources of Variables 
 
 






Measurement Pred. Sign Source(s)
1. Greenfield B Greenfield = 1; Acquisition = 0 Greenfield Investments: fDi Markets (2014), 
ThomsonOne SDC (2014); Acquisitions: 
ThomsonOne SDC (2014), Zephyr (2014)
2. Firm Size C LN Total Assets - ThomsonOne SDC (2014), Unternehmensregister 
(2014)
3. Profitability C ROE = Net Income / Total Assets - ThomsonOne SDC (2014), Unternehmensregister 
(2014)
4. Publicly Traded B Publicly Traded = 1; Non-Publicly 
Traded = 0
- Bloomberg (2014)
5. High R&D Intensity C/B
b R&D Intensity = Patents/N° of 
Employees; High R&D Intensity = 
R&D Intensity > 24.70% = 1; R&D 
Intensity < 24.70% = 0
+ Patents: European Patent Register (2014); N° of 
Employees: ThomsonOne SDC (2014), 
Unternehmensregister (2014), firm Websites
6. Low R&D Intensity C/B
c R&D Intensity = Patents/N° of 
Employees; Low R&D Intensity = 
R&D Intensity < 0.19% = 1; R&D 
Intensity > 0.19% = 0
- Patents: European Patent Register (2014); N° of 
Employees: ThomsonOne SDC (2014), 
Unternehmensregister (2014), firm Websites
7. International 
Experience
C N° of years since first international 
experience
+/- ThomsonOne SDC (2014), firm Websites
8. Local Experience C N° of years since first experience in 
Portugal
+/- ThomsonOne SDC (2014), German Chamber of 
Commerce (2014), firm Websites
9. German Experience C N° of years since first German entry 
in sector in Portugal
+ ThomsonOne SDC (2014), AICEP (2014), German 
Chamber of Commerce (2014), firm Websites
10. First Entrant B First Entrant = 1; Follower = 0 - ThomsonOne SDC (2014), AICEP (2014), firm 
Websites
11. Market Concentration C                                , with x  = volume                                                                                                       
of sales
+ 2004-2012: Instituto Nacional de Estatística (2014); 
1995-2003: Sarmento/Nunes (2011)
12. Growth in Output C YoY% of Output by Industry + Instituto Nacional de Estatística (2014)
13. Growth in 
Productivity
C YoY% of GVA by Industry/N° of 
Total Jobs by Industry
- Instituto Nacional de Estatística (2014)
14. Change in Business 
Confidence
C YoY% of Business Confidence by 
Industry
- European Commission (2014)
15. Takeover Targets C LN N° of firms in Target Industry - Instituto Nacional de Estatística (2014)
16. Eurozone B Member of Eurozone = 1; Not a 
Member of Eurozone = 0
+/- Publicly Available Information
a
 Binary (B) / Continuous variable (C) 
b 
Continuous variable transformed into binary variable.
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Appendix C: Complete Results for Binary Logit Regression: Greenfield (1) vs. Acquisition (0) 
 
 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix D: Conditional Marginal Effects at the Means for Significant Continuous and 
Dichotomous Variables 
 









No Yes No Yes No Yes
Firm Size
a
8.18 8.27 65.69% 98.38% 42.05% 52.58% 94.05% 5.45% 79.22%
German Experience 49.34 49.84 65.69% 98.38% 42.05% 52.58% 94.05% 5.45% 79.22%
Growth in Output 4.50% 4.60% 65.69% 98.38% 42.04% 52.58% 94.05% 5.45% 79.22%
Growth in Productivity 3.18% 3.28% 65.69% 98.38% 42.05% 52.58% 94.05% 5.45% 79.22%
No Yes No Yes No Yes
Firm Size
a 8.18 8.27 66.31% 98.42% 42.72% 53.28% 94.21% 5.60% 79.68%
German Experience 49.34 49.84 65.97% 98.42% 42.72% 52.89% 94.12% 5.52% 79.43%
Growth in Output 4.50% 4.60% 66.05% 98.41% 42.43% 52.98% 94.14% 5.53% 79.49%
Growth in Productivity 3.18% 3.28% 65.22% 98.35% 41.54% 52.06% 93.93% 5.34% 78.88%
No Yes No Yes No Yes
Firm Size
a 8.18 8.27 0.95% 0.04% 1.62% 1.32% 0.16% 2.66% 0.57%
German Experience 49.34 49.84 0.42% 0.04% 1.62% 0.59% 0.07% 1.18% 0.26%
Growth in Output 4.50% 4.60% 0.55% 0.03% 0.93% 0.76% 0.09% 1.53% 0.33%
Growth in Productivity 3.18% 3.28% -0.72% -0.03% -1.21% -0.99% -0.13% -1.95% -0.44%
Continuous Variable
Continuous Variable Mean







































Appendix E: Results for Robustness Checks 
 
Source: Own Contribution 
 
1. Intercept -12.625 ** -4.020 ** -9.687 ** -4.020 ** -10.002 ** -4.020 ** -4.616 * -4.020 **
(5.493) (1.937) (4.878) (1.937) (4.960) (1.937) (2.707) (1.937)
2. Firm Size
a
0.371 * 0.340 ** 0.362 ** 0.340 ** 0.407 ** 0.340 ** 0.289 0.340 **
(0.199) (0.166) (0.181) (0.166) (0.183) (0.166) (0.186) (0.166)
3. Profitability 0.339 -0.332 -0.631 -0.904
(3.680) (3.537) (3.585) (3.396)
4. Publicly Traded
b
-5.277 *** -4.427 *** -4.860 *** -4.427 *** -4.901 *** -4.427 *** -4.842 *** -4.427 ***
(1.880) (1.484) (1.659) (1.484) (1.664) (1.484) (1.797) (1.484)
5. High R&D Intensity
b
2.441 2.657 ** 2.323 ** 2.657 ** 2.442 ** 2.657 ** 2.398 ** 2.657 **
(1.229) (1.109) (1.167) (1.109) (1.176) (1.109) (1.197) (1.109)
6. Low R&D Intensity
b
1.127 ** 0.298 0.273 0.818
(1.358) (1.125) (1.106) (1.257)
7. International Experience 0.045 0.009 0.038
(0.028) (0.016) (0.027)
8. Local Experience -0.065 -0.007 -0.049
(0.043) (0.020) (0.041)
9. German Experience 0.033 * 0.025 ** 0.024 0.025 ** 0.027 0.025 ** 0.026 * 0.025 **
(0.018) (0.010) (0.016) (0.010) (0.016) (0.010) (0.016) (0.010)
10. First Entrant
b
-1.937 -1.584 -1.655 -1.585
(1.979) (1.845) (1.813) (1.844)
11. Market Concentration 5.260 3.698 3.067 2.453
(5.705) (5.358) (5.355) (5.084)
12. Growth in Output 19.867 16.050 * 17.591 * 16.050 * 16.922 16.050 * 17.402 * 16.050 *
(10.881) (8.820) (10.312) (8.820) (10.292) (8.820) (9.734) (8.820)
13. Growth in Productivity -20.272 -20.853 ** -19.120 * -20.853 ** -18.745 * -20.853 ** -21.124 ** -20.853 **
(10.204) (9.233) (9.874) (9.233) (10.165) (9.233) (9.635) (9.233)
14. -0.027 -0.060 -0.071 0.028
(0.154) (0.156) (0.149) (0.151)
15. Takeover Targets
a




3.736 ** 4.192 *** 3.273 ** 4.192 *** 3.289 ** 4.192 *** 4.453 *** 4.192 ***
(1.469) (1.379) (1.377) (1.379) (1.381) (1.379) (1.455) (1.379)
Log-Likelihood -22.155 -25.570 -23.408 -25.570 -23.538 -25.570 -23.979 -25.570
R
2
0.5518 0.4828 0.5265 0.4828 0.5239 0.483 0.5150 0.4828
𝟀2 54.560 47.73 52.06 47.73 51.8 47.730 50.91 47.73
p -value < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001
Note: N  = 73. For each model, the first (Initial) and final steps are shown. 
a 
Variable is a natural logarithm.
b 
Variable is binary.
* p < 0.1
** p < 0.05
*** p  < 0.01
Greenfield = 1
Change in Business 
Confidence
Initial Final Initial Final Initial Final Initial Final
A B C D
